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Abstract 
An important topic, in electoral studies, is the choice of the electoral system, which will 
be applied in parliamentary elections, because parliamentary seats distributed to 
political parties differ when a different system is applied. In this paper we focus on the 
five latest electoral systems applied in Greek Parliamentary Elections. Each one of them 
is described and analysed, in detail. Different measures of disproportionality are used in 
order to evaluate and compare these systems. We provide implementation details and 
illustrations using the data set of the latest parliamentary elections of 1996 and various 
data sets generated by introducing noise to the initial data set. 
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1. Introduction 
In all communities, democracy necessarily means representative democracy in 
which elected officials make decisions on behalf of the people. People express their 
will and chose their leaders or representatives by voting. The indispensable task of the 
election of the representatives, in democracies is performed by the electoral system. 
The electoral system is the set of methods that are used in the elections, for the 
translation of vote totals into representative seats in the Parliament. Because of the 
central role elections play in so many modern states, the influence of electoral 
systems on politics, and vice versa, has long been a justifiable concern of the 
discipline of political science. Taagepera and Shughart (1989) give a general 
statement of the role elections and electoral systems play in political life. They 
describe the electoral systems and their characteristics and present an empirical 
analysis of the electoral systems. Also, Lijphart (1994) analyse the operation and the 
political consequences of electoral systems, particularly the degree of proportionality 
of their translation of votes into seats and their effects on party systems. The emphasis 
is given to the electoral systems that have been used in the European democracies.  
The study of electoral systems and their links to political issues and regime 
stability leads itself to quantitative analysis. Unlike many areas of social sciences, our 
data are already provided in a ‘hard’ quantitative form: numbers of votes and numbers 
of seats. Systematic quantitative studies of electoral systems have been relatively rare. 
The studies in the field have been limited to particular countries, promoting particular 
types of systems. 
The aim of this study is to describe and analyse the operation of Greek 
Parliamentary Electoral systems. In particular we provide a quantitative study of 
Greek systems of the period 1974-1999. We compare these systems, with respect to 
the proportionality of their translation of votes into seats. 
Reviewing the electoral systems literature, Lijphart and Gibberd (1985) noted 
the absence of one serious attempt to solve the problem of how to measure 
proportionality or disproportionality. There are many ways to measure inequality, see 
for example Allison (1978), but because they exceed a certain level of complexity, the 
results they provide became difficult to interpret. Gallagher (1991), presents and 
reviews the main Proportional Representation methods and discuses the principles 
 
 
2 
underlying each of them. He also presents measures of disproportionality, suggests 
some new indices and applies these measures to competitive elections of the period 
1979-1989. Lijphart (1994) has also applied some indices of disproportionality in a 
study of twenty-seven democracies of the period 1945-1990. 
Electoral systems are creatures of politics and can be altered for political 
reasons. Even when an electoral system is stable, it is affected by a large number of 
issues such as socio-economic, religious, political and ethnic factors. In Greece the 
last 25 years five different electoral systems have been applied. Our purpose is to 
describe and analyse these electoral systems in detail. We present the rules of the 
allocation of the seats, for all the systems under consideration. We comment the rules, 
the characteristics and differences between the electoral systems.  
The most important point is the comparison and the evaluation of the Greek 
Electoral Systems [1974, 1977 (1981), 1985, 1989, 1993 (1996)] using some 
measures of disproportionality. Disproportionality is the deviation of the parties’ seat 
shares from their vote shares. In the category of Proportional Representation systems 
(PR systems), where the Greek electoral systems we analyse, can be thought of, there 
are two broad categories of measures of disproportionality. The first concentrates on 
the absolute difference between parties’ seats and votes, and the second focuses on 
the ratio between the party’s seats and votes. For the evaluation of the Greek systems 
we apply the Rae’s, Loosmore-Hanby, Least Square, Adjusted Loosmore-Hanby, 
Lijpart indices, which belong to he first category, and the Sainte-Langue and d’Hondt 
indices, which belong to the second category. We also apply the Regression index, 
which is a satisfactory measure of big-parties’ bias. We implement the Greek systems 
using the data set of the parliamentary elections of 1996. In order to achieve more 
accurate results we use a large number of data sets generated by introducing noise 
(error) to the initial data set. 
The paper is organised as follows. Electoral systems and their categories are 
presented in section two. Greek electoral systems are described and their 
characteristics and properties are presented in section three. In section four the 
measures of disproportionality are described, and the dataset we use together with the 
various generated datasets are described in section five. In section six we apply the 
Greek electoral Systems and the measures of disproportionality in the parliamentary 
elections of 1996 and also in the generated datasets. We also present the results of the 
elections for the European Parliament of 1999, in Greece, under the current system. 
Finally, we conclude in section seven with a brief discuss of the main results of this 
study. 
 
2.  Electoral Systems 
The foremost purpose of this study is to analyse and evaluate the Greek 
electoral systems. The first step that needs to be taken towards this purpose is the 
description and classification of the electoral systems. We present the main categories 
of systems that have been used in Parliamentary Elections, in different countries all 
over the world. Almost all electoral system experts agree that the two most important 
features of the electoral systems are a) the electoral formula, which is the method that 
is used for the translation of vote totals into representative seats and b) the district 
magnitude, which is the total number of seats given to each district (the geographical 
regions that are used for the distribution of the seats). According to these features the 
electoral systems can be distinguished into three main categories, and, of course, a 
large number of subtypes. 
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2.1 Majoritarian Systems 
The rule is the majority of votes, in some cases absolute majority is used in 
some other relative majority. The district magnitude is usually one or closes to one. 
The main types of the majoriarian systems are a) Plurality (First Past The Post or 
relative majority): the rule is the relative majority. b) Two ballot majority plurality: 
the rule is the absolute majority in the first ballot. If this is not achieved, relative 
majority is applied in a second ballot and c) Alternative vote: the rule is the absolute 
majority of the first preferences. If this is not achieved, the weakest candidate is 
eliminated. 
The most striking characteristic of all these systems is that they usually use 
single member districts or districts with magnitude close to one. Now, in most 
countries, which use majoritarian systems, only single-member districts have 
survived. 
 
2.2 Proportional Representation systems 
The purpose of these systems is to give ‘proportional’ results, which means 
that they distribute seats to parties according to the total number of votes that they 
have received. Thus, the way that seats are distributed to parties is based on its total 
number of votes and also on the number of the available seats. This type of systems 
can be distinguished in two categories. 
• Largest remainders (Quota systems): Each party is awarded as many seats as it 
has full quotas. The quota is based on the available number of seats (s) and the 
number of votes each party casts (v). The main quota that are used are: 
a. Hare or Natural quota, which divides the total votes by the available seats in the 
district, that is, Hare quota = v/s, 
b. Droop quota or Hagenbach-Bischoff, which divides the total votes by the 
available seats in the district plus one, that is Droop quota = v/(s+1), 
c. Imperiali quota, where total votes are divided by s+2, that is Imperiali quota = 
v/(s+2).  
• Highest Averages methods: They are based on the number of votes each party 
casts (vi) and the number of seats it has already won (si). The main rules are: 
a. Sainte Lague, where each seat is given to the party with the highest value of 
vi/(2si+1), 
b. d’ Hondt, where each seat is given to the party with the highest value of 
vi/(si+1).I 
In fact, each time a party receives a seat, progressively larger numbers divide  
its original vote total. Seats are, successively, allocated to the party with the 
'highest average' at each step. The variation between the methods lies in the 
sequence of numbers employed as divisors. Sainte Lague uses the sequence 1, 
3, 5, ..., 2n-1, while d’ Hondt uses the sequence 1, 2, 3, ... . 
 
2.3 Intermediate types 
These are systems that do not fit either the majoritarian or the PR categories. 
In this category belongs the Limited Vote (LV) system. The rule is the plurality with 
the exception that voters vote for fewer candidates than there are seats to be filled in 
the district. In this category, are included the Reinforced PR systems, which also do 
not fit either the majoritarian or the PR categories perfectly. In some countries we 
meet a mixture of the majoritarian and the PR categories, like the French system of 
1951 and 1956. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
3. Greek Electoral systems 
3.1. Introduction 
Greek Electoral systems do not fit either the majoritarian or the PR categories 
and most of the analysed systems (1974, 1981, 1985) are referred to as Reinforced 
PR. However, these systems can be regarded as sufficiently similar to PR and for this 
reason Lijphart (1994) includes them in his comparative analysis of all PR systems. 
All of them are list systems. In ‘list PR’ systems voters may or may not be allowed to 
express a preference to a particular candidate or candidates within the list. In Greece, 
in some cases, a purest form of list PR, which is the ‘closed list’, is used. It is pure 
because voters choose only the party they prefer, making no choice to individual 
candidates. In that case, each party submits a list of candidates prior to the election. 
The seats the party wins are distributed in rank of the fixed list. Thus, if there are 
seven seats to be filled, each party will ordinarily submit a list of 7 candidates. If one 
party wins three seats, it elects the top three candidates of the list. In case of an ‘open 
list’ system, voters select a party and then, if they desire, they express a preference for 
a particular candidate, or candidates, within the list. Vote totals are translated into 
parliamentary seats occupied by the deputies. The parliament, in all cases, studied, 
consists of 300 deputies. The distribution of the 288 seats takes place in three steps: 
the primary, secondary, and tertiary distribution of seats, with the only exception of 
the 1989 system. A last step followed for the allocation of 12 additional seats 
occupied by the State Deputies. 
The primary distribution is done in 56 lower districts, the secondary in 9 up to 1985 
and 13 after then. The major districts and both the tertiary and the distribution of state 
deputies, are carried out throughout the state. For more details, see Pantellis and 
Triantafyllou (1985), Dretakis (1989), Dimitras (1991), and Nikolakopoulos (1989).. 
A brief description of each electoral formula is given below. Before the description of 
the systems some terms must be defined. Lower districts ('nomoi', or 'elassones 
eklogikes periferies'): the geographical regions in which the state is divided, for the 
primary distribution of the seats. Major districts ('meizones eklogikes periferies'): the 
geographical regions in which the state is divided, for the secondary distribution of 
the seats. Higher districts: the geographical regions in which the state is divided, for 
the tertiary distribution of the seats. District magnitude: it is the number of the 
available seats in the corresponding district. Quota: in Greece the term 'electoral 
measure' is used. As it has already been mentioned, in the case of the Largest 
Remainders PR systems, the quota is the ratio in which the distribution of the seats is 
based. This ratio involves the number of the seats and the number of the votes, and it 
depends on the method that is used (e.g. Hare, Droop) and on the district where it is 
applied (e.g. Lower, Major, Higher). 
 
3.2. Description of the Greek Electoral systems: 
1974 system (Reinforced PR system)  
Primary Distribution of Seats: The state is divided in 56 lower districts which 
are almost the same as 52 geographical-administrative districts (‘nomoi’) of the 
country. In fact only the prefecture of Attica is divided in 5 districts and the prefecture 
of Thessaloniki in two districts, due to overpopulation, while the other remain the 
same. The seats are distributed, in each lower district, among all alternatives: 
independent candidates, single parties and cartels of two or more than two parties. 
The distribution is done according to the total number of votes. For this purpose, the 
total number of the valid votes, in each district, is divided by the district magnitude. 
The integer part of this ratio is known as Hare Quota. The Hare quota is applied in 
each district. The total number of valid votes is divided by the quota, for each 
alternative. Parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas. In case of an 
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independent candidate, he takes one seat only if his total number of valid votes is 
greater or equal to the quota. In districts with magnitude equal to one the relative 
majority rule is applied: the seat is given to the party with the highest total of votes, 
in this district. Any remaining available seats are distributed in the following step. 
Secondary Distribution of Seats: The distribution is carried out in 9 Major 
Districts. Each one of them consists of four five or even ten lower districts. The 
parties take part in the allocation of the seats only if they satisfy the following 
conditions: 
• Single parties with a percentage of total votes greater or equal to 17%. 
• Cartels of two parties with a percentage of total votes greater or equal to 25%. 
• Cartels of more than two parties with a percentage of total votes greater or equal to 
30%. 
• Independent candidates are not included. 
The remaining available seats, after the primary distribution, are aggregated, in each 
respective major district. The distribution of the remaining seats, in the major 
districts, is done according to a new quota. It is defined as the ratio of the total votes 
for the parties taking place in this distribution, in each major district, divided by the 
respective remaining seats. Then the integer part of this ratio is taken. Thus, the Hare 
quota is used adjusted to the major districts and to the available seats. Parties are 
given as many seats as they have won quotas. 
Tertiary Distribution of Seats The parties which participate in this distribution 
are those who took part in the secondary distribution. The distribution of the seats is 
done throughout state. The quota is defined as the ratio of the total votes, in the 
nation, of the parties participating in this distribution divided by the number of the 
available seats. Then, the integer part of the ratio is taken. Thus, the Hare quota is 
used, adjusted to the entire state and to the available seats. Parties are given as many 
seats as the have won quotas. If there are still undisposed seats they are given to the 
party with the highest percentage of votes in the nation. 
Distribution of Seats of State Deputies: In this distribution of the 12 seats, all 
parties that participated in the secondary and the tertiary distribution are allowed to 
participate. The quota is defined as the ratio of the total votes, in the nation, of the 
parties participating in this distribution divided by 12. (Hare) Parties are given as 
many seats as the have won quotas. Any remaining seats are given to the parties with 
the largest remainders of votes. The remainder is the total number of votes that have 
not been used for the allocation of the seats when the quota is used. 
1977, 1981 systems (Reinforced PR system) 
The national elections of 1977 and 1981 were carried out with the exact same 
system. The distribution of the seats is exactly the same with the 1974 system except 
for the primary distribution. The Droop quota is used for the allocation of the seat in 
the lower districts, in the primary distribution, instead of the Hare quota. 
1985 system (Reinforced PR system) 
Primary Distribution of Seats: Again the state is divided in 56 lower districts 
which are almost the same as the previous systems. Seats are distributed, in each 
lower district, among all alternatives: independent candidates, single parties and 
cartels of two or more parties. The distribution is done according to the total number 
of votes. For this purpose, the distribution of seats for single parties and cartels of 
more than two parties is done in the following way: In districts with magnitude equal 
to one, the relative majority rule is applied. In districts with magnitude greater or 
equal to two, and those are the multi-member districts, seats are given according to 
the Droop quota. In each lower district Droop quota is computed. That is, the total 
number of the valid votes, in each district, divided by the district magnitude increased 
by one ('sin ena'). The total number of valid votes, for each party, and for each 
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district, is divided by the Quota of the district. Each party occupies as many seats, in a 
district, as many times the quota is contained in the party's total valid votes of this 
district. Simply, parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas. The 
distribution of the seats for the independent candidates is done in the following way: 
An independent candidate takes one seat in a lower district only if its total valid votes 
in this district is greater or equal to the droop quota. If the previous procedure gives in 
some districts more seats than available, the seats that are in excess are subtracted. In 
a district the ‘surplus’ seat is subtracted from the party with the smallest remainders. 
The remainders are the seats that have not been used for the allocation of the seats. In 
case two or more parties have the same remainder, the selection of the party is done 
randomly. Any remaining seats are distributed in the following step. 
Secondary Distribution of Seats: The distribution is carried out in 9 Major 
Districts. Each one of them comes from the aggregation of four, five or even ten 
lower districts. Single parties and cartels of more than two parties take part in the 
allocation of the seats, while independent candidates are excluded. 
The distribution of the remaining seats of the primary distribution is done, in each 
major district, in the following way: The available seats from the primary distribution 
are aggregated in each major district. A new quota is defined in each major district. It 
is the ratio of the total votes, for the parties taking place in this distribution, divided 
by the respective remaining seats in each major district (Hare). Each party takes as 
many seats in a district as the times the quota is contained in the party's total valid 
votes of this district. Simply, parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas. 
Tertiary Distribution of Seats: The parties, which participate in this 
distribution, are also those who took part in the secondary distribution. Thus 
independent candidates are excluded. This distribution is done throughout the state. 
The remaining undisposed seats from the primary and the secondary distribution is 
computed in each lower district. The remaining seats, in each lower district, are given 
to the party that has also the plurality of total votes, in this lower district, only if this 
party has achieved the plurality of total valid votes throughout the state. For the 
remaining seats, the ratio of the total votes divided by the remaining number of seats, 
is computed Parties are given as many seats as the have won quotas (Hare). Any 
remaining seats are given to the party with the highest percentage of votes in the 
nation. 
Distribution of Seats of State Deputies: The parties, which participate in this 
distribution, are those who took part in the secondary distribution, and also the 
tertiary distribution. Thus, independent candidates are excluded. The quota is defined 
as the ratio of the total votes in the nation of the parties participating in this 
distribution divided by 12 (Hare quota). Parties are given as many seats as they have 
won quotas. For the remaining seats the d’ Hondt rule, is applied 
1989 system (PR system) 
Primary Distribution of Seats: It is exactly the same as the primary 
distribution of the 1985 system. 
Secondary Distribution of Seats: The distribution is carried out in 13 Major 
Districts. Each one of them consists of two, three or even six lower districts. Single 
parties and cartels of more than two parties are allowed to take part in the allocation 
of the seats, in this stage, while independent candidates are excluded. 
The distribution of the seats is done, in each major district, in the following way: The 
remaining valid votes for single parties and cartels of more than two parties, are 
aggregated, in each major district. The remaining votes, for each party, are its votes 
that have not been accounted for the seats allocation in the primary distribution. The 
sum of the remaining votes is divided by the respective available seats, in each major 
district. Then the integer part of the ratio is taken. Each party occupies, in a district, as 
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many seats as the times the ratio is contained in the party's total remaining valid votes 
of this district. The available seats are given to parties (single parties and cartels of 
more than two parties) according to their remaining valid votes from the above 
allocation of seats and the one of the primary distribution. This means that the party 
with the highest value of the remaining votes takes the first seat. The party with the 
second highest value takes the second seat, and so on. 
If there are single parties or cartels of more than two parties with total percentage of 
valid votes greater or equal to 2%, they obtain at least 3 seats. In case of parties with a 
total percentage of valid votes smaller or equal to 2%, but not smaller than 1%, they 
obtain at least one seat. For that purpose, if there are single parties or cartels of more 
than two parties that have the right to obtain 3 seats and have not reached this 
number, the next procedure follows. The distribution of seats to these parties is done 
according to the total percentages of votes, in major districts, such as: the party with 
the highest percentage of valid votes, in the district, obtains the first seat, the party 
with the second highest percentage of valid votes takes the second seat and so on. The 
procedure continues until they reach the number of three seats. If there are single 
parties or cartels of more than two parties that have the right to obtain 1 seat and they 
have not obtain it yet, they take the seat in the major district where they have gained 
the highest number of valid votes. If, there is a major district in which there are more 
parties that they have the right to obtain a seat, than seats, the available seats are 
given to the parties according to highest  percentages of valid votes.  
If there are still available seats, they are distributed to the rest of the parties (single 
parties or cartels of more than two parties). The same procedure is followed as the one 
used for the allocation of the seats in the secondary distribution. Thus, the sum of the 
remaining votes is divided by the number of the respective available seats, in each 
major district. The seats that have already been awarded to parties in the primary and 
the secondary distribution, so far, are not taken into account. Then the integer part of 
the ratio is taken. Each party occupies, in a district, as many seats as the times the 
ratio is contained in the party's total remaining valid votes of this district. The 
remaining seats are given to parties (single parties and cartels of more than two 
parties) according to their remainding of valid votes. 
Distribution of Seats of State Deputies: The parties, which participate in this 
distribution, are those who took part in the secondary distribution. Thus, independent 
candidates are excluded. The quota is defined as the ratio of the total votes in the 
nation of the parties participating in this distribution divided by 12 (Hare). Parties are 
given as many seats as the havey won quotas. For the remaining seats the d'Hondt 
formula is applied 
 
1993, 1996 systems (Reinforced PR system) 
In this system only single parties, cartels of parties and independent candidates 
with total percentage of votes greater or equal to 3% compete. Parties with percentage 
of valid votes greater or equal to 3% of the total valid votes obtain a minimum 
number of seats. This number is equal to the integer part of the 70% of the seats that 
correspond to the percentage of party's valid votes, multiplied by 300. 
Primary distribution: It is exactly the same with 1985 system.  
Secondary distribution: The Hare quota is applied in the major districts. For 
that purpose, the available seats from the primary distribution are aggregated in each 
major district. The quota is defined in each major district. It is the ratio of the total 
votes for the parties taking place in this distribution divided by the respective 
remaining seats in each major district. Each party takes as many seats in a district as 
the times the quota is contained in the party's total valid votes of this district. Simply, 
parties are given as many seats as they have won quotas. 
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Tertiary distribution: The Hare quota is applied throughout the state, while 
the remaining seats are given to the single party with the highest value of total valid 
votes in the entire state.  
Distribution of State Deputies: The Hare quota is applied throughout the state. 
The remaining seats are given to the parties according to the d’ Hondt rule. 
 
Table 1: The main rules, for all systems, for each one of the Primary (A), Secondary 
(B), Tertiary (C) and State Deputies (S. D.) distribution. 
 A  B C S. D. 
 Magn.=1 Magn≠1    
1974 Relative 
Majority 
(d’Hondt) 
 Hare 
 Quota 
Hare 
Quota 
(17%) 
Hare Quota 
Remaining: 
1st party 
Hare 
Largest 
Remainders 
1977-
1981 
Relative 
Majority 
(d’Hondt) 
 Droop 
 Quota 
Hare 
Quota 
(17%) 
Hare Quota 
Remaining: 
1st party 
Hare 
Largest 
Remainders 
1985 Relative 
Majority 
(d’Hondt) 
 Droop 
 Quota 
 
 Clause for 
‘surplus’ 
 seats 
Hare 
Quota 
(17%) 
Rel. Majority 
(Lower+State) 
Remaining: 
1st party 
Hare Quota 
d’Hondt. 
1989 Relative 
Majority 
(d’Hondt) 
 Droop 
 Quota 
 Clause for 
‘surplus’ 
 seats 
Based on  
Remainder 
of votes 
 Hare Quota 
d’Hondt. 
1993 Relative 
Majority 
(d’Hondt) 
 Droop 
 Quota 
 Clause for 
‘surplus’ 
 seats 
Hare 
Quota 
(3%, 70%) 
Hare Quota 
Remaining: 
1st party 
Hare 
d’Hondt. 
      
3.3 Some comments on the systems 
We present in Table 1, the rules for all systems, for each one of the Primary (A), 
Secondary (B), Tertiary (C) and State Deputies (S. D.) distribution. Some comments 
on these rules follow. The 1974 system uses the Hare quota in the primary 
distribution while the other use the Droop quota (‘plus one’). Given that the Hare is 
greater than the Droop quota, more seats are allocated in the primary distribution 
when the Droop is applied. Thus, the Droop favour more the small parties and 
especially those that do not take place in the secondary distribution. The systems 
applied in 1974, 1981 and 1985 include thresholds for the participation in the 
secondary distribution. They are not very important as in most cases only the two 
largest parties participate in the second distribution. The secondary distribution of the 
1989 system is dramatically different from the others. It uses the remainders of votes, 
and not the total votes. Thus, proportional results are favoured. 
Small parties are enforced in the 1989 system because parties with at least 1 
per cent of votes take at least one seat and parties with at least 2% of votes take at 
least three seats. The 1993 system imposes an important threshold for small parties. 
All parties with total percentage of votes smaller than 3% are not allowed to obtain 
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seats. On the other hand, the parties with percentage of votes greater or equal to 3% in 
the entire state, obtain a minimum number of seats which depends on their votes (70% 
× 300 of votes). Thus, middle parties are favoured. Seats given to small parties are 
reduced from the second party, which loses a lot of its power. 
 
4. Measures of disproportionality 
In order to evaluate the Greek electoral systems, we use measures of 
disproportionality. Disproportionality means the deviation of the parties' seats shares 
from their votes shares, while perfect proportionality is the situation in which every 
party receives exactly the same share of seats with the share of the votes it receives. 
Some systems achieve more proportional results, some other less. We want to find out 
which system belong to each category. For this purpose we use the measures of 
disproportionality. When we use these measures we seek for small values of the 
index, in order to obtain the fairest system. 
 In the case of PR systems there are two broad categories of measures, 
corresponding to the two main types of allocation methods. The first category of 
measures concentrates on the absolute difference between a parties’ seats and votes as 
the Largest Remainders methods do. The methods in the second category focus on the 
ratio between a parties’ seats and votes, just as the Highest Averages methods do. We 
also present a satisfactory measure of big-parties bias that completes the measures of 
disproportionality. We present the measures of disproportionality we use according 
the category they belong. 
Absolute difference based measures 
• Rae’s index [Rae (1967)]: it sums the absolute differences between vote 
percentages (vi) and seat percentages (si) and the outcome is divided by the number 
of the political parties (ni) : Ι = −∑1ni iv is . 
• Loosemore-Hanby's Index [Loosemore and Hanby (1971)]: it sums the absolute 
differences between vote percentages (vi) and seat percentages (si) and the outcome 
is divided by two : D iv is= −∑
1
2
. 
• Least Square Index [Gallager (1991, 1993)]: the least square index entail 
squaring the vote-seat difference for each party, adding these values, dividing the 
sum by two and taking its square root: LSq iv si= −

∑
1
2
2
 
• Adjusted Loosemore-Hanby [Grofman and Lijphart (1986)]: it differs from Rae's 
index in that it divides the total amount of disproportionality by the effective 
number of parties's N, see, for example Laakso and Taagepera (1979), rather than 
the real number of parties n. N can be calculated either on bases of vote share's: 
( )N iv= ∑
1
2  or seats share's: ( )N is= ∑
1
2 . Thus, the index is given by 
N i iv s−∑ . 
• Lijphart index [Lijphart (1994)]: He simply uses the largest deviation in an 
election result as an overall index of disproportionality: Lijph = max sv ii −  
 
Ratio based measures 
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• Sainte-Lague index, for more details see Gallagher (1991). It is given by  
( )vi si
vi
−




∑
2
 
• D' Hondt index, for more details see Gallagher (1991), It is given by the seats’ 
percentages to the votes’ percentages ratio of the most over-represented party:  
D’ Hondt= max 
v
s
i
i  
 
Big parties bias measure 
• Regression index: We apply the index proposed by Cox and Shugart (1991). They 
regress the parties’ seat percentages on vote percentages. The slope of the 
regression line provides a simple index of big-parties bias. 
 
5. Data generation method 
In this study, we compare the latest five Greek electoral systems using the measures 
of disproportionality. If we want to find a ‘good’ estimate for a particular measure, we 
must use a large number of election results. Thus, in order to take accurate results, it 
would be better to use a large number of data sets. We applied some methods for the 
generation of voter preferences on different alternatives, found in the literature. These 
methods are the Impartial culture-Uniform assumption, see, Merill (1984, 1988), the 
Normal assumption, see, Bordley (1983), and the Spatial model, see, Champerlin and 
Cohen (1978). After their implementation we concluded that these methods are not 
suitable for our study. For this reason, we used the data set taken from the latest 
Greek Parliamentary elections of 1996, and we generated a large number of other 
dataset by introducing noise (error) in the initial dataset.  
It is very well known that the political party which governs, for a period of 
time, losses some voters. These voters are disperted to other political parties or 
independent candidates. The second most powerful political party usually increases 
its total number of votes. The above phenomenon characterises the Greek Electorate. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to examine the possibility of generating data sets according 
to the characteristic described above. We generate a large number of data sets with 
the use of the real data set of total votes, of each political party, in each Lower 
District, and by using the following procedure. 
The total number of votes for the first political party, in each district, is 
eliminated according to a value, which is taken from a Normal distribution with mean 
zero, and variance which is related to the real number of votes of this party, in each 
district. The total number of votes, for the second political party, in each district, is 
increased according to a value which is taken from a Normal distribution with mean 
zero and variance which is related to the real number of votes of this party, in each 
district. For the rest of the political parties we change the total number of votes, in 
each district, by introducing noise in the initial number of votes. The votes are 
generated from a Normal distribution with mean value equal to the real number of 
votes and variance based on the votes, of each political party, in each district. 
Therefore, the algorithm that we use is the following. Let n be the real number of 
districts and m the real number of political parties. For each district i, i=1,...,n do 
step one:  
 
For the first political party, m=1 
• take a value εi from the normal distribution N(0,c1Υ1,i) 
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• calculate the absolute value of εi 
• the number of votes for the first political party, m=1, for the i-th district is given by 
Υnew,1,i = Υ1,i - abs(εi), where Υ1,i is the real number of votes of the first political 
party for the i-th district, c1 is a number which changes the number of votes for the 
first political party in each district by the percentage we want (2%-5%), and Υnew,1,i 
is the generated number of votes for the first political party for the i-th district. 
step two: 
For the first political party, m=2 
• take a value εi from the normal distribution N(0,c2Υ2,i) 
• calculate the absolute value of εi 
• the number of votes for the first political party, m=2, for the i-th district is given by 
Υnew,2,i = Υ2,i + abs(εi), where Υ2,i is the real number of votes of the second political 
party for the i-th district, c2 is a number which changes the number of votes for the 
second political party in each district by the percentage we want (2%-5%), and 
Υnew,2,i is the generated number of votes for the second political party for the i-th 
district. 
Step three: 
For the rest of the political parties, m≠1,2 
• take a value εi from the normal distribution N(Υm,i, c3Υm,i) 
• the number of votes for the rest political parties, m≠1,2, for the i-th district is given 
by Υnew,m,i = εI, where Υm,i is the real number of votes of the rest political parties 
for the i-th district, c3 is a number which changes the number of votes for the rest 
political parties in each district by the percentage we want, and Υnew,m,i is the 
generated number of votes for the second political party for the i-th district. 
 
6. Application  
6.1. Application with real data set  
We used the data-set of the Greek Parliamentary elections of the 22nd of 
September of 1996 taken from the Ministry of Interior. Although 32 parties (single, 
cartels and independent candidates) competed, we took into account only the six 
largest of them. The other 26 obtained total percentage of valid votes less than 1% 
each. We found impractical to study each one of them separately, as such a small 
percentage does not allow to the small parties to obtain seats in the parliament. So we 
treated them as ‘other’ party which is like one party with total votes the sum of the 
votes of the 26 parties. The ‘other’ party was not permitted to obtain seats. 
Each one of the five latest Greek electoral systems was applied using the 1996 
data-set. The number of parties was 6 and each one of them was treated as a single 
party. The number of the lower districts was 56, while 9 and 13 major districts were 
used. The results are summarised in the following tables. 
 
 
Table 2a: Seats that would have been distributed to parties, for each system, and for 
13 major districts, for the 1996 election results. 
   Party    
System 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
1974  152 137 1 4 4 2 
1977 (1981) 156 133 1 4 4 2 
1985 164 125 1 4 4 2 
1989 136 118 11 12 12 11 
1993 (1996) 164 106 0 11 10 9 
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Table 2b: The measures of disproportionality evaluated for the seats obtained by each 
party, according to the analysed systems (13 major districts), for the 1996 election 
results. 
 1974 1977 1985 1989 1993 
Rae index 0,0519 0,0519 0,0519 0,0154 0,0401 
LH  0,1557 0,1557 0,1557 0,0463 0,1203 
LSq  0,0986 0,1006 0,1094 0,0325 0,0997 
LH-adjusted 0,3115 0,3115 0,3115 0,0926 0,1873 
Lijphart  0,0917 0,1050 0,1317 0,0383 0,1317 
Sainte-Lague 0,1509 0,1524 0,1608 0,0140 0,0908 
D’Hondt 0,2210 1,2531 1,3174 1,2455 0,1317 
Regression  1,1841 1,1855 1,1882 1,0580 1,1242 
 
The allocation of the seats to the parties differs a lot when the different 
systems are applied. We can notice from Table 2a that the first party receives the 
majority of the parliamentary seats (more than 150) when the different Reinforced PR 
systems are applied, while the 1989 system does not provide to the first party the 
majority of the seats. The determination of the majority of the seats is one important 
topic in the analysis of Electoral systems.  
The results of the measures which are presented in Table 2b permit us to 
present some interesting observations: a) all indices, except d’ Hondt give almost the 
same result. The 1989 system seems to be the most proportional. It gives significant 
smallest values of these indices when it is compared with the other systems. b) The d’ 
Hondt index shows that the 1993 system is the system which provides the smallest 
overrepresentation of the most overrepresented party. In other words, the values of the 
d’ Hondt index correspond the most overrepresented party, and the smallest 
overrepresentation appears in case of 1993. c) After 1989 the most proportional is the 
1993 system. The Lijphart index gives the 1993 system as proportional as the 1985 
system. d) The other three seems to give more similar results, while 1985 seems less 
fair when Lsq, Lijphart, Sainte-Lague, d’Hondt, and Regression are examined. e) a 
regression coefficient greater than 1 shows that all systems favor the big parties. Less 
biased in favor of big parties is given by the 1989 system, and the next less biased in 
favour of large parties is the 1993 system. The other three systems do not differ with 
respect to the regression index. However, as we move from older to newer systems 
(1974, 1981, 1985) more bias is given in favor of big parties.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3a: Seats that would have been distributed to parties, for each system and for 9 
major districts 
   Parties    
System 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1974  154 135 1 4 4 2 
1977 (1981) 153 136 1 4 4 2 
1985 161 127 1 4 5 2 
1989 136 117 11 13 12 11 
1993 (1996) 160 110 0 11 10 9 
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Table 3b: The measures of disproportionality evaluated for the seats distributed to 
each party according to the analysed systems (9 major districts), for the 1996 election 
results. 
 1974 1977 1985 1989 1993 
Rae index 0,0519 0,0519 0,0508 0,0143 0,0356 
LH  0,1557 0,1557 0,1524 0,0429 0,1069 
LSq  0,0994 0,0989 0,1041 0,0312 0,0894 
LH-adjusted 0,3115 0,3115 0,3048 0,0859 0,2139 
Lijphart  0,0983 0,0950 0,1217 0,0383 0,1138 
Sainte-Lague 0,1514 0,1511 0,1513 0,0121 0,0813 
D’Hondt 0,2371 1,2290 1,2933 1,2455 0,2853 
Regression  1,1848 1,1844 1,1838 1,0547 1,1228 
 
We notice that in both cases (9 major districts, 13 major districts), all systems 
provide an absolute majority of seats (more than 150 seats for the first party), except 
the case of 1989 system even though the same data set is used (see tables 2a and 3a.) 
We also notice no significant differences in the results with respect to seat shares as 
well as the indices, when 9 major districts are applied. 
 
6.2. Application with the generated data set 
We applied the proposed data generation method for c1=c2=350. It is a value 
that permits different election results, without producing significant differences in the 
total number of the valid votes, in each lower district, in the generated datasets. This 
permits us to use the same values for the lower districts magnitude, with the real data 
set. Furthermore, it is a value that produces datasets that sometimes permit absolute 
majority of seats, for the first party, and some times not. A smaller variation in vote 
totals was selected for the small parties, c3=100. The number of parties is 6, of the 
lower districts is 56, while again 9 and 13 major districts are considered. 10 data-sets 
have been created and the measures of disproportionality have been computed for 
each of the generated data sets. We apply this analysis because we want to confirm 
the previous results taken from only one data set, with the results of the generated 
data sets. In this way, we find the allocation of the seats according to each system, 
when other possible data sets have been considered from the elections. We also can 
see the sensitivity of the analysed systems by noticing the seats allocated to each party 
and the sensitivity of the measures of disproportionality we use. In order to find the 
fairest system, we can use the mean values of the measures of disproportionality we 
analyse. The results (mean values and standard deviations of measures of 
disproportionality) are illustrated in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Mean values and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the indices for each 
system, when 13 major districts are used. 
 1974 1977 1985 1989 1993 
Rae index 0,0524 
(0,0010) 
0,0515 
(0,0012) 
0,0502 
(0,0008) 
0,0149 
(0,0033) 
0,0359 
(0,0027) 
LH  0,1521 
(0,0180) 
0,1548 
(0,0035) 
0,1507 
(0,0026) 
0,0450 
(0,0101) 
0,1173 
(0,0254) 
LSq  0,1008 
(0,0017) 
0,0983 
(0,0024) 
0,1023 
0,0039 
0,0301 
0,0057 
0,0903 
(0,0064) 
LH-adjusted 0,3163 
(0,0047) 
0,3096 
0,0071 
0,3016 
(0,0052) 
0,0895 
(0,0205) 
0,2159 
(0,0168) 
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Lijphart  0,0992 
(0,0056) 
0,0929 
(0,0065) 
0,1182 
(0,0085) 
0,0308 
(0,0068) 
0,1192 
(0,0084) 
Sainte-Lague 0,1564 
(0,0048) 
0,1495 
(0,0075) 
0,1482 
(0,0075) 
0,0154 
(0,0058) 
0,0780 
(0,0112) 
D’Hondt 1,1447 
(0,3168) 
1,1296 
(0,3239) 
1,0916 
(0,4151) 
1,3016 
(0,1454) 
1,1940 
(0,3083) 
Regression  1,1866 
(0,0028) 
1,1832 
(0,0044) 
1,1799 
(0,0033) 
1,0537 
(0,0122) 
1,1214 
(0,0253) 
 
From the analysis of the above results we can arrive at the following 
conclusions: a) One way analysis of variance indicated no significant differences 
between the results for 9 and 13 major districts, when each one of the measures under 
consideration is used. b) all indices except d’ Hondt show that the 1989 system give 
the most proportional results. c) the d’ Hondt index shows that the 1985 is the system 
which provides the smallest overrepresentation of the most overrepresented party. d) 
all indices except d’ Hondt give almost the same results. The high correlation between 
the other 7 indices is shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5. The correlation between the 8 measures. 
 Rae LH LSq LH-adj Lijphar
t 
S-L d’Hond
t 
Rae 1       
LH 0,9354 1      
LSq 0,9554 0,9196 1     
LH-adj 0,9996 0,9360 0,9552 1    
Lijpart 0,7682 0,7704 0,9177 0,7668 1   
S-L 0,9860 0,9220 0,9135 0,9865 0,7027 1  
d’Hond
t 
-0,2317 -0,2211 -0,2347 -0,2299 -0,2053 -0,2201 1 
regress 0,9741 0,9178 0,9154 0,9743 0,7208 0,9776 -0,2227 
 
e) after 1989 the most fair system is the 1993 system, except for the d’Hondt index 
which gives second the 1985 system, f) the other three seems to give more similar 
results, while 1985 seems the fairest when Rae Lh, Lh-adjusted, d’ Hondt, and 
Regression are examined, g) the regression index shows that all systems favor the big 
parties. Less biased in favor of big parties is the 1989 system. Next is the 1993 
system, while, as we move from older to newest (1974, 1981, 1985) less bias is given 
in favor of larger parties. 
 
 
The results taken from the indices are illustrated in Graph 1 
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Graph 1. The mean values for each one of the 8 indices, for each one of the 5 
systems under consideration. 
 
 
Application with the data of the 1999 Elections for the European Parliament 
 
In this section, we present the results of the 1993 (1996) electoral system when the 
dataset of the 1999 elections for the European Parliament is used. 
The latest elections for the European Parliament took place on the 13th of June of 
1999 in all the counties of the European Community. For this reason Greek voters 
voted for their 25 representatives in the European Parliament. Each one of these 
representatives belongs to a Greek political party. We suppose that, the Greek citizens 
vote for the same political parties (representatives) for the election of their 
representatives in the Greek Parliament (not for the European Parliament). We want 
to find out the results of this hypothetical election, when the current electoral system 
(for the Greek Parliamentary Elections) is used. 
The number of the votes and the respective percentages for the six large parties is 
given in the following table 
 
Party Votes % votes 
Pasok 2090762 32,69 
New Democracy 2301866 35,99 
Political Spring 146039 2,28 
K.K.K 554915 8,67 
Synaspismos 330589 5,16 
DH.K.KI 439712 6,87 
 
Table 16: The total number of votes and the percentages of votes used in the analysis, 
taken from the 1999 elections for the European Parliament in Greece. The last column 
gives the real percentages of votes 
 
Party Seats % seats % seats/% votes 
Pasok 93 31 0,94 
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New Democracy 165 55 1,52 
Political Spring 0 0 - 
K.K.K 18 6 0,69 
Synaspismos 10 3,33 0,63 
DH.K.KI 14 4,66 0,66 
 
Table 17: The seats that would have been distributed to parties, using the 1993 (1996) 
electoral system, for the 1999 election results. It also includes the ratio of the 
percentage of seats divided by the percentage of votes.  
 
Table 17 confirms all the comments and the results that we have presented for the 
1993 (1996) system. We note that the first party is overrepresented a lot while this 
does not happen for the second party: PASOK which obtained the 32,69\% of the total 
votes, would have obtained the 31\% of the total seats, if National Parliamentary 
Elections would have been applied. On the other hand the first party, NEW 
DEMOCRACY, which obtained the 35,99\% of the total votes, would have obtained 
the 55\% of the total seats, if National Parliamentary Elections would have been 
applied. This fact consists the most important disadvantage of this system. Middle 
parties like K.K.E., SYNASPISMOS and DH.K.KI. are enforced by taking seats from 
the second party. Finally the party POLITICAL SPRING takes no seats 
 
8. Discussion 
 In this study, we described and analysed the Greek Electoral systems of the 
period 1974-1999. We also, provided a systematic quantitative analysis in order to 
compare and evaluate these electoral systems. The comparison of electoral systems by 
using quantitative measures is not broadly used in the literature, and has not been 
applied in Greek Parliamentary Elections before. 
 The analysis of the Electoral systems led to some important conclusions. The 
system of 1989, in contrast to the other systems, does not provide to the first party the 
majority of the parliamentary. This system seems to be the fairest according to the 
most measures of disproportionality that we analysed. The second fairest system is the 
one used in 1993, while the other three seem to give similar results. 
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